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1 Introduction 
Discourse Representation Theory is a specific name for the work of Hans Kamp 
in the area of dynamic interpretation of natural language. Also, it has gradu-
ally become a generic term for proposals for dynamic interpretation of natural 
language in the same spirit. These proposals have in common that each new 
sentence is interpreted in terms of the contribution it makes to an existing piece 
of interpreted discourse. The interpretation conditions for sentences are given 
as instructions for updating the representation of the discourse. 
This article first introduces the problem that discourse representation theory, 
in its specific sense, sets out to solve. Then the basic ideas of the theory are 
listed, various later extensions are briefly discussed, and the relation to partial 
interpretation of language is sketched. 
2 The Problem of Unbound Anaphora 
The most straightforward way to establish links between anaphoric pronouns 
and their antecedents is to translate the pronouns as variables bound by their 
antecedents . This approach. does not work when the link crosses a sentence 
boundary, as in example (1) . 
(1) A man1 met an attractive woman2 . He1 smiled at her-i. 
It should be possible to interpret the first sentence of this discourse as soon as 
it is uttered, and then later on, while processing the second sentence, establish 
the links between the pronouns and their intended antecedents . 
One possible solution is translating the indefinites by means of existential 
quantifiers with scopes extending beyond the sentence level, and then allow the 
variables for the pronouns to be captured by these quantifiers. But this will not 
do: at some point the scope of a quantifier has to be 'closed off', but further on 
another pronoun may occur that has to be linked to the same antecedent. 
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The bound variable approach to anaphora also fails for cases where a pronoun 
in the consequent of a conditional sentence is linked to an indefinite noun phrase 
in the antedent of the conditional, as in example (2). 
(2) If a man1 meets an attractive woma112, he1 smiles at he7"2. 
A possible approach here would be to view (2) as a combination of the noun 
phrases a man and an attractive woman with a structure containing the ap-
propriate gaps for antecedents and pronouns, viz. (3). This is the approach of 
quantifying-in, taken in traditional Montague grammar (see the article MON-
TAGUE GRAMMAR). 
(3) If PR01 man meets PR02, PR01 smiles at PR02. 
This approach does not work here, however. Quantifying-in the indefinite noun 
phrases in (3), i.e. in a structure that has the conditional already in place, 
would assign the wrong scope to the indefinites with respect to the conditional 
operator. 
Note that the meaning of (2) is approximately the same as that of (4). 
( 4) Every man who meets an attractive woman1 smiles at he1) . 
In this case as well, quantifying-in does not allow one to generate the most likely 
reading where the subject of the sentence has wide scope over the enbedded 
indefinite. Sentences with the patterns of (2) and ( 4) have reached the modern 
semantic literature through Geach (1962). Geach's discussion revolves around 
examples with donkeys, so these sentences became known in the literature as 
donkey sentences. 
As has repeatedly been remarked in the literature, there are quite striking 
structural parallels between nominal and temporal anaphora. The past tense 
can be viewed as an anaphoric element in all those cases where it is not to be 
understood as 'sometime in the past' but as referring to some definite past time. 
(5) John saw Mary. She crossed the steet. 
In example (5), presumably the seeing takes place at some specific time in the 
past, and the crossing immediately after the seeing. Again, we have an anaphoric 
link across sentence boundaries, and a traditional operator approach to tense 
does not seem to fit the case. Although tense is not treated in the pioneer papers 
on discourse representation, it is clear that the problem of temporal anaphora 
is a very important subproblem of the general anaphora problem that discourse 
representation theory sets about to solve. 
3 Basic Ideas 
Discourse representation theory as it was presented in Kamp (1981) addressed 
itself specifically at the problem of the previous section, although confined to 
nominal anaphora. The basic idea of the approach is that a natural language 
discourse (a sequence of sentences uttered by the same speaker) is interpreted in 
the context of a representation structure. The result of the processing of a piece 
of discourse in the context of representation structure Risa new representation 
structure R'; the new structure R' can be viewed as an updated version of R. 
The interpretation of indefinite noun phrases involves the introduction of dis-
course referents or reference markers for the entities that a piece of discourse 
is about. In the following, the term discourse referent will be used. Discourse 
referents are essentially free variables. Thus, indefinite noun phrases are repre-
sented without using existential quantifiers. The quantification is taken care of 
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by the larger context . It depends on this larger context whether an indefinite 
noun phrase gets an existential reading or not. 
The life span of a discourse referent depends on the way in which it was 
introduced. All 'alive' referents may serve as antecedents for anaphors is subse-
quent discourse. Anaphoric pronouns are represented as free variables linked to 
appropriate antecedent variables. Definite descriptions in their simplest use are 
treated in a way which is similar to the treatment of anaphoric pronouns: defi-
nite noun phrases in their anaphoric use are treated like indefinite noun phrases, 
i.e. they are translated as free variables, but give rise to additional anaphoric 
links. The treatment of other, functional uses of definite noun phrases (as in A 
car crashed. The driver emerged unhurt.) is more involved. 
The difference between indefinite noun phrases on one hand and definite 
noun phrases and pronouns on the other, is that indefinites introduce new vari-
ables, whereas the variables introduced by definites and pronouns always are 
linked to an already established context. In other words, the difference between 
definites (including pronouns) and indefinites is that the former refer to entities 
that have been introduced before, i.e. to familiar entities, while the latter do 
not . 
Quantifier determiners , i ._e . determiners of noun phrases which are neither 
definite nor indefinite, can bind more than one variable. Specifically, they can 
bind a block of free variables some of which may have been introduced by indefi-
nites . Conditional operators (if . .. then ... constructions) can also bind blocks 
of free variables. Not all variables introduced by indefinites are in the scope of 
a quantifier or a conditional operator. Those which are not are existentially 
quantified over by default. 
The processing of a piece of discourse is incremental. Each next sentence 
to be processed is dealt with in the context of a structure which results from 
processing the previous sentences. The processing rules decompose a sentence, 
replacing the various parts by conditions to be added to the structure. Assume 
one is processing discourse (1) in the context of representation structure (6) 
containing just one discourse referent and one condition . 
( 6) ( x) ( street( x)) . 
As was mentioned before, indefinite noun phrases give rise to new discourse ref-
erents, and definite noun phrases are linked to existing discourse referents . The 
indefinite in the first sentence of (1) introduces a new discourse referent y and 
two conditions man(y) and y walked down the street. The second condition can 
be decomposed further by introducing a fresh discourse referent in the structure, 
linking this discourse referent to an existing discourse refernt, and replacing the 
definite noun phrase with the discourse referent in two new conditions. This 
gives three new conditions all in all: z = x, street(z) and walked-down(y, z) . 
The discourse representation structure now looks like (7). 
(7) (x , y, z)(street(x), man(y) , z = x, street(z) , walked-down(y, z)) . 
Processing the second sentence of (1) gives rise to a new link and a new condition. 
The final result is (8). 
(8) (x, y , z, u)(street(x), man(y), z = x, street(z), walked-down(y, z), 
u = y, whistled(u)). 
All representation conditions in the above example are atomic. Quantified noun 
phras es or logical operators such as conditionals or negations give rise to com-
plex conditions. The representation structure for ( 4) given in (9) provides an 
example. 
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(9) ((x, y)(man(x), woman(y), attractive(y), meet(x, y))) 
=> ((), ( smiles-at(x, y )) ). 
In the box format that many people are perhaps more familiar with, (9) looks 




woman y => smiles-at {x,y) 
attractive y 
meet {x,y) 
Formal definitions and truth conditions for these representation structures will 
be given in the next section. 
Kamp (1981) and Kamp & Reyle (1990) spell out the rules for processing 
sentences in the context of a representation structure in all the required formal 
detail. An important feature of the rules is that they impose formal constraints 
on availability of discourse referents for anaphoric linking. Roughly, the set 
of available discourse referents consists of the discourse referents of the current 
structure, plus the discourse referents of structures that can be reached from the 
current one by a series of steps in the directions left, (i.e. from the consequent of a 
pair R => R' to the antecedent, and up, i .e. from a structure to an encompassing 
structure. The constraints on discourse referent accessibility are used to explain 
the awkwardness of anaphoric links as in (11). 
(11) *If every man1 meets an attractive woman2 , he1 smiles at hef'2. 
Such data can be disputed, but space does not permit such indulgence here. 
Discourse referents for proper names are always available for anaphoric refer-
ence; to reflect this fact, such discourse referents are always included in the list 
of discourse referents of the top level structure. 
To account for deictic uses of pronouns, use is made of anchored structures. 
An anchored structure is a pair consisting of a representation structure R and a 
function f, where f is an anchor for a subset of the discourse referents of R, i.e . 
f assigns appropriate individuals in a model to these discourse referents. For 
example, structure (6) could be anchored by mapping discourse referent x to an 
appropriate street. Deictic pronouns are handled by linking them to anchored 
discourse referents. 
Essentially the same approach to natural language analysis as was proposed 
in Kamp (1981) is advocated in Heim (1982). Heim uses the metaphor of a filing 
cabinet: the established representation structure Risa file, and additions to the 
discourse effect a new structure R', which is the result of changing the file in the 
light of the new information (see the article FILE CHANGE SEMANTICS). 
The main program of discourse representation theory (in its generic sense) 
is an attempt to regard semantic interpretation as a dynamic process map-
ping representations plus contexts to new representations plus contexts. As 
Partee (1984) remarks, this shift from static semantics to dynamic semantics 
cum pragmatics means an enrichment of the enterprise of formal semantics, and 
should therefore make it easier to establish contact with other schools of seman-
tics and/or pragmatics. Partee's prediction was proved correct in subsequent 
years by the widespread use of discourse representation theory in computational 
linguistics and by the application of techniques of anaphora resolution from Ar-
tificial Intelligence in systems based on discourse representation theory. 
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Discourse representation theory has also provided new inspiration to tra-
ditional Montague grammarians, who tend to be less than satisfied with the 
contextual rules for analysing discourse on the grounds that the influence of 
context make it difficult to work out what contribution individual phrases make 
to the meaning of the whole . A suitable dynamic perspective on the process of 
interpretation has shown these compositionality qualms to be unfounded, and 
discourse representation theory has been instrumental in bringing this dynamic 
turn about. See the article DYNAMIC INTERPRETATION for details. 
Heim (1990) contains a perceptive appraisal of various alternatives to the 
approach of discourse representation theory (in its generic sense) to the problem 
of unbound anaphora. 
4 Discourse Representation Structures 
Formally, a discourse representation structure R consists of two parts: a finite 
list of discourse referents, and a finite list of conditions. The discourse referents 
in the list are called the discourse referents of R. The conditions of a structure 
R may contain discourse referents that are not included in the list of discourse 
referents of R. Conditions can be atoms, links, or complex conditions. An 
atom is a predicate name applied to a number of discourse referents, a link is 
an expression t = r, where r is a discourse referent, and t is either a proper 
name or a discourse referent . The clause for complex conditions uses recursion: 
a complex condition is a condition of the form R ⇒ R', where R and R' are 
discourse representation structures. 
Next one defines truth for discourse representation structures with respect 
to a model. Call M = (D ,I) an appropriate model for discourse representation 
structure R if I maps the discourse referents of R to members of D, the n-place 
predicate names in the atomic conditions of R to n-place relations on D, the 
names occurring in the link conditions of R to members of D, and (here is the 
recursive part of the definition) M is also appropriate for the structures in the 
complex conditions of R . 
Let M = (D, I) be an appropriate model for structure R. An assignment in 
M = (D,I) is a mapping of discourse referents to elements of D. Assignment 
A verifies R in M if there is an extension A' of A with the following properties: 
1. A' is defined for all discourse referents of R and for all discourse referents 
occurring in atomic or link conditions of R. 
2. If P(r1, ... , rn) is an atomic condition of R then 
(A'(ri), .. . , A'(rn)) E I(P). 
3. If t = r is a link condition of R and t and r are both discourse referents, 
then A'(t) = A'(r); if tis a proper name and r a discourse referent, then 
I(t) = A'(r). 
4. If R1 ⇒ R2 is a complex condition of R, then every assignment for R 1 
which verifies R1 and agrees with A' on all discourse referents that are 
not discourse referents of R 1 also verifies R2 • 
A structure R is true in M if the empty assignment verifies R in M. These 
definitions can be modified to take anchors into account in the obvious way, by 
focussing on assignments extending a given anchor. 
Clearly, the expressive power of this basic representation language is quite 
limited . In fact, there is an easy recipe for translating representation structures 
to formulae of first order predicate logic. Assuming that discoarse referents 
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coincide with predicate logical variables, the atomic and link conditions of a 
representation structure are atomic formulae of predicate logic. The translation 
function ° which maps representation structures to formulae of predicate logic 
is defined as R0 = I\ Cf, where /\ indicates a finite conjunction and the Cf are 
the translations of the conditions of R. The translation for conditions is in turn 
given by the following clauses. 
• For atomic conditions: C 0 = C. 
• For complex conditions: (R1 => R2) 0 = Vx1 · · · Vxn(R1-+ 3y1 · · · 3y,nR2), 
where x1, . .. , Xn is the list of discourse referents of R1 and Y1, . .. Y1n the 
list of discourse referents of R2. 
It is easy to show that R is true in M under the definition given above if and 
only if R 0 is true in M for some assignment, under Tarski's definition of truth 
for first order predicate logic. 
A slight extension of the discourse representation language allows for the 
treatment of negation. Negated conditions take the form ,R, where R is a 
discourse representation structure. Negations of atomic conditions are treated 
as negations of discourse representation structures containing just one atomic 
condition. The discourse referents of a negated structure are not available for 
anaphoric linking outside that structure. 
The definition of satisfaction has to take negated conditions into account. 
Here is the required extension of the definition. Assignment A verifies R in M 
if there is an extension A' of A with the following properties: 
l. - 4. As above. 
5. If ,R' is a complex condition of R, then no assignment which agrees with 
A' on all discourse referents that are not discourse referents of R' verifies 
R' . 
Translation into predicate logic now has to take care of negation as well . The 
translation clause for negated conditions runs as follows. 
Here xi, ... , Xn is the list of discourse referents of R. It is easy to see that 
the given translation is meaning preserving. It is also not difficult to give a 
meaning preserving translation in the other direction. This shows that the 
discourse representation language extended with negation has precisely the same 
expressive power as first order predicate logic. 
5 Extensions: Tense and Plurals 
Partee (1984) gives a survey of proposals to extend discourse representation the-
ory with discourse referents for times and events to exploit the parallels between 
nominal and temporal anaphora. In example (5) from section 2, where first ref-
erence is made to a seeing event in the past, and then to an event of crossing 
the street which takes place immediately after the seeing event, an anchoring 
mechanism can be used to link the seeing event to the appropriate time, and 
an anaphoric link between events can constrain the time of the crossing event 
in the appropriate way. Also, the dynamic effect of shifting the reference time 
can be incorporated by using a designated discourse referent for the reference 
time and specifying that this discourse referent be updated as a side effect of 
the processing of sentences denoting events. 
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Next, there are examples where a reference is picked up to an indefinite time 
in the past. 
(12) Mary arrived during the day. She let herself into the house. 
In example (12), the arrival takes place at some indefinite time on a specific day 
(presumably anchored) in the past . The event of Mary's entering the house is 
then linked to the time of arrival. Again, all that is needed is the introduction 
of an event discourse referent for the arrival event, and an appropriate linking 
of this event discourse referent to the reference time discourse referent: the 
reference time discourse referent starts pointing at a time interval just after the 
time of arrival. The processing of the next sentence introduces an event that 
is constrained to be included in the reference time interval, and has again as a 
side effect that the reference time discourse referent gets shifted to refer to a 
time interval just after the house entering event. 
Sentence (13) provides an example of quantification over times. 
(13) When Bill called, Mary was always out. 
The example gives rise to a complex representation of the form R ⇒ R', with 
an event discourse referent and a reference time discourse referent introduced in 
the lefthand structure, and a state discourse referent of the righthand structure, 
with the state constrained to include the reference time interval. 
An operator account of tenses and temporal adverbs has the awkwardness 
that the tense operator is redundant if a temporal adverb is present, as in (14), 
but not otherwise. Also, assigning the correct scopes to these operators poses 
problems. 
(14) Bill called last Friday around noon. 
In the discourse representation approach, where tenses translate into event or 
state variables linked to an a:ppropriate reference time, temporal operators are 
simply translated as predications on the event discourse referent, and the awk-
wardness vanishes. See Kamp & Rohrer (1983) and Partee (1984), plus the 
references cited there, for details. 
As for the incorporation of the singular /plural distinction, an obvious first 
move in any attempt to accommodate plural anaphoric pronouns is to make a 
distinction between singular and plural discourse referents . Singular pronouns 
are linked to singular discourse referents, plural pronouns to plural discourse 
referents. Plural indefinite noun phrases (some women, three men) introduce 
plural discourse referents, but it turns out that many other introduction mech-
anisms have to be postulated to get a reasonable coverage of plural anaphoric 
possibilities. 
Plural discourse referents may result from summation of singular discourse 
referents . This is to account for uses of they that pick up a reference to a set 
of individuals which have been introduced one by one. Next, plural individuals 
may be the result of abstraction from complex conditions. Comsider example 
(15). 
(15) John bought every book Mary had mentioned. 
He started reading them straight away. 
Obviously, them refers to the set of all books mentioned by Mary. No plural 
discourse referent is introduced by the first sentence, so the only way to make 
one available is by calling it into being through abstraction. 
So-called dependent plurals should be handled differently again, because here 
the plurality seems closely linked to syntax. Sentence (16) provides an example. 
(16) All my friends have children. 
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It is clear that (16) is still true if each of my friends has exactly one child. De-
pendent plurals call for a kind of in-between discourse referent which is neutral 
between singular and plural. The chapter on plurals in Kamp & Reyle (1990) 
gives a very detailed account of these and related matters. The article PLU-
RALITY provides further information on general issues of the interpretation of 
plurals. 
6 Incorporating Generalized Quantifiers 
Extending discourse representation theory with non standard quantifiers, and 
then getting the truth conditions right, is not completely straighforward. 
(17) Most farmers who own a donkey beat it. 
Applying a routine strategy for building a representation structure for example 
(17), one arrives at structure (18), where R =>m=> R' is true if most verifying 
assignments for R are verifying assignments for R' . 
(18) ((x,y)(farmer(x), donkey(y), own(x,y))) =>m=> (()(beat(x,y))). 
This analysis does give the wrong truth conditions, because it quantifies over 
farmer-donkey pairs instead of individual farmers. In a situation where there 
are five kind farmers who each own one donkey and treat it well, and one cruel, 
rich farmer who beats each of his ten donkeys, the analysis makes sentence (17) 
true, while intuitively it should be false in this situation. 
The remedy (proposed in Kamp & Reyle (1990)) involves a complication in 
the notation . Generalized quantifiers are introduced explicitly in the represen-
tation structures. The revised representation for (17) is (19) . 
(19) ((x,y)(farmer(x), donkey(y), own(x,y))) =>';:10st⇒ (()(beat(x,y))). 
At the place of most in (19) one could in principle have any generalized quantifier 
(see the article QUANTIFIERS) . In other words, for every binary generalized 
quantifier Q and every pair of representation structures R, R', the following is 
a complex condition: R =>~=> R'. The truth conditions are modified to reflect 
what is expressed by the quantifier Q. Generalized quantifiers expres relations 
between sets, so R =>~=> R' is true in case the two sets are in the appropriate 
quantifier relation. The truth conditions must pick out the two relevant sets. 
Here is the new part of the definition: Assignment A verifies R in M if there is 
an extension A' of A with the following properties: 
l. - 5. As above. 
6. If R1 =>~=> R2 is a complex condition of R, then A' verifies this condition 
if the sets Band Care in the quantifier relation denoted by Q, where B = 
{b I A' has an extension f with f(v) = b which verifies R 1 in M} and C = 
{ c I A' has an extension g with g( v) = c which verifies R 1 and R 2 in M} . 
It is left to the reader to check that this gets the truth conditions for (17) right . 
7 Discourse Structures and Partial Models 
There is more than an occasional hint in the original papers of Kamp and Heim 
that discourse representation· structures are closely connected to partial models . 
If the suggestion is not that these representation structures are themselves par-
tial models , it is at least that they are intended to be interpreted with respect 
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to partial models. That the structures are themselves partial models cannot be 
right: complex conditions are constraints on models rather than model com-
ponents. They specify general properties that a model must have to satisfy 
t he condition. Interpretation of discourse representation structures in partial 
models has never really been· worked out. The truth definitions for representa-
t ion structures, e.g. in Heim (1982), Kamp (1981), Kamp & Reyle (1990) define 
satisfaction in classical (i.e. 'complete') models. 
Because the representation structures contain identity links and negated 
identity links, evaluation in partial models where not only the predicates used 
to translate the vocabulary of the fragment, but also the identity predicate 
receives a partial interpretation, is feasible. Interestingly, this sheds light on 
some puzzling aspects of identity statements. Current studies of partial model 
theory interpret identity as a total predicate (see Langholm (1988) or the article 
on PARTIAL INFORMATION) . Partializing identity leads to a more radical 
form of partially; it has as its effect that the objects in the model are not 
proper individuals but rather proto-individuals that can still fuse into the same 
individual after some more information acquisition about the identity relation. 
Technically, this form of radical partiality can be implemented by evaluating 
discourse representation structures with respect to models where the identity 
relation is a partial relation. 
The formal development of a theory of partial identity involves an inter-
pretation of identity as a pair (1+,1-), with 1+ an equivalence relation which 
denotes the positive extension of identity, and 1- an anti-equivalence relation, 
that is to say a relation which is irreflexive, symmetric and anti-transitive, i.e . 
satisfying the requirement that if 1-xy then it holds for all z that 1-xz or 1- zy. 
The assumption that proto-individuals rather than regular individuals pop-
ulate the partial models is attractive from the point of view of knowledge rep-
resentation: often human beings have only partial information about identities. 
Famous paradoxes and puzzles are based on this fact . One example is Frege's 
morning star, evening star paradox; see the article IDENTITY. Another is Saul 
Kripke's Pierre puzzle. Pierre is a Frenchman who has read about a famous 
and wonderful city he knows as Landres, and because of his reading he thinks 
that Landres is pretty. Later on he is abducted and forced to work in a slum 
in a city that , as he learns, is called London, and this new experience leads 
him to conclude that London is ugly. The important point to note is that as 
long as all this information is processed with respect to a partial model where 
London and Landres name different proto-individuals, Pierre's beliefs are not 
incoherent. They only become incoherent once it is discovered that London and 
Landres are identical, i.e. once Pierre acquires additional information about the 
extension of the identity relation. From outside, from a situation where London 
and Landres are anchored to the same individual, the belief may seem incoher-
ent as well, but the point is -that Pierre does not have full information about 
the nature of this anchor. The example is discussed in the context of discourse 
representation theory in Asher (1986), but the solution proposed there is still 
phrased in terms of classical models. 
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